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FROM SPINOZA TO HEGEL TO THE BRITISH IDEALISTS 
Robert Stern 
Abstract 7KLV SDSHU LV D GLVFXVVLRQ RI +HJHO¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH SULQFLSOH µRPQLV
GHWHUPLQDWLRHVWQHJDWLR¶ZKLFKKHDWWULEXWHVWR6SLQR]a. It is argued, however, that 
Spinoza understood this principle in a very different way from Hegel, which then sets 
up an interpretative puzzle: if this is so, why did he credit Spinoza with formulating 
it? This puzzle is resolved by paying attention to the context in which those 
attributions are made, while it is also shown that the British Idealists (unlike many 
contemporary commentators) were aware of the complexities in the Spinoza-Hegel 
relation on this issue. The paper also addresses some of the philosophical debates 
UDLVHG E\ WKLV TXHVWLRQ DQG WKH OLJKW LW VKHGV RQ +HJHO¶V FULWLTXH RI 6SLQR]D DV D
monist. 
 
This paper concerns an interpretative puzzle, and also the philosophical lessons that 
can be learnt from it. The interpretative puzzle concerns HHJHO¶VXVHRIWKHVORJDQµDOO
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ LV QHJDWLRQ¶ ZKHUH WKLV LGHD IRUPV DQ LPSRUWDQW SDUW RI +HJHO¶V
metaphysical thinking, and one that he is often said to have got from Spinoza, based 
not least on comments Hegel himself makes. But in fact, the way in which Hegel 
understands the doctrine seems to be the opposite of the way in which Spinoza 
understood it: roughly, for Hegel the negation that comes with determination is 
necessary for being in any genuine sense, whereas for Spinoza the negation that 
comes with determination is a privation of being, a way of not being ± so while for 
Hegel such determination through negation is a necessary condition if being is not to 
collapse into nothing, for Spinoza it is a taking away of being. How, then, did this 
inYHUVLRQ FRPH DERXW ZK\ GLGQ¶W +HJHO PDNH LW FOHDUHU DQG ZK\ KDV LW EHHQ VR
frequently missed? And, philosophically speaking, what hangs on it, and what role 
GRHVLWSOD\LQ+HJHO¶VFULWLTXHRI6SLQR]D" 
 In this paper, I want to examine what this difference between the Hegelian and 
Spinozistic ways of taking the doctrine amounts to, and how it is to be explained. I 
also want to explore the impact this difference had on the British Idealists. I will 
argue that several of the British Idealists (unlike several contemporary Hegel 
commentators) clearly saw the contrast between Spinoza and Hegel here, where some 
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(such as the Cairds) objected to Spinoza precisely because he failed to understand the 
doctrine in a Hegelian manner, while others (such as Bradley) used it in a more 
Spinozistic way, which then caused concern to the other British Idealists, and led to 
criticisms of his view. 
 7KH SDSHU ZLOO SURFHHG DV IROORZV ,Q 6HFWLRQ , , ZLOO SUHVHQW +HJHO¶V RZQ
ZD\ RIXQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH µGHWHUPLQDWLRQ LV QHJDWLRQ¶SUinciple. In Section II, I will 
FRQWUDVW WKLV ZLWK 6SLQR]D¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI ZKDW LW LQYROYHV ,Q 6HFWLRQ ,,, , ZLOO
consider various accounts of how it is that Hegel came to associate his position with 
6SLQR]D¶VZKHUH WKLVFDQEHVHHQ WREHYHU\SX]]OLQJ Ln the light of what has gone 
before. In Section IV, I will turn to the way in which the British Idealists viewed the 
doctrine, and the role it played in their disagreements. Finally, in Section V, I will 
consider how this discussion can help in understandiQJ+HJHO¶VFULWLTXHRI6SLQR]D
and what it involves. 
 
1. Hegel on determination is negation 
$VLVZHOONQRZQWKHµGHWHUPLQDWLRQLVQHJDWLRQ¶SULQFLSOHHPHUJHVDWWKHEHJLQQLQJ
RI+HJHO¶VLogic, as part of the dialectical movement from pure being, to nothing, to 
becoming, to determinate being. Roughly speaking, here he argues that in order for 
what is to be anything more than an empty and abstract pure being (which is 
indistinguishable from nothing), and so be in a determinate manner, it must involve 
some negation ± i.e. some sort of differentiation within it, whereby it contains some 
distinct elements that are heterogeneous in some way and so negate each other. The 
SULQFLSOHWKXVSOD\VDQLPSRUWDQWUROHZLWKLQ+HJHO¶VRQWRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQZKHUHLWLV
crucial WR KLV FDVH DJDLQVW 3DUPHQLGHDQ PRQLVP ZKLFK WUHDWV UHDOLW\ DV D µRQH¶
lacking in any element of difference; rather, Hegel argues, reality must incorporate 
some element of differentiation, of distinctions within being, where without these 
µQHJDWLRQV¶LW would not comprise determinate being, but would be no more than the 
nothingness of pure being. 
 Now, in putting forward this position, Hegel seems to strongly associate 
himself with Spinoza, and to credit the latter with influencing his views. Thus, in the 
Science of Logic, he writes:1 
                                                          
1
 8QOHVVVWDWHGRWKHUZLVHUHIHUHQFHVWR+HJHO¶VWH[WVDUHJLYHQILUVWWRWKHTheorie 
Werkausgabe edition, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Marcus Michel 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969), by volume and page number, as well as section number 
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Determinateness is negation posited as affirmative - this is the proposition of 
Spinoza: omnis determinatio est negatio. This proposition is infinitely 
important. (5:121 (SL:113); translation modified)2 
 
Similarly, in the Encyclopedia Logic we find the following: 
 
We certainly also represent being as absolute riches, and nothing, on the 
contrary, as absolute poverty. But when we consider the entire world, and say 
simply that everything is, and nothing further, we leave out everything 
determinate, and, in consequence, have only absolute emptiness instead of 
absolute fullness« 7KH EDVLV RI DOO GHWHUPLQDF\ LV QHJDWLRQ omnis 
determinatio est negatio, as Spinoza says). (EL §87Z and §91Z (8:187-8 
(EL:140-1) and 8:196 (EL:147)) 
 
NRW VXUSULVLQJO\ VXFK FRPPHQWV KDYH OHDG WR D FRPPRQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI +HJHO¶V
relation to Spinoza on this issue, namely that in developing his position, Hegel was 
IROORZLQJ6SLQR]D¶VOHDG&KDUOHV7D\ORUWKXVUHSUHVHQWVDZLGHVSUHDGYLHZZKHQKH
starts by VHWWLQJ RXW +HJHO¶V SRVLWLRQ DORQJ WKH OLQHV , KDYH VXJJHVWHG DQG WKHQ
associates this with Spinoza: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
if appropriate, and then to one of the following translations using the abbreviations 
below: 
 
EL The Encyclopedia Logic, translated by T. F. Gereats, W. A. Suchting 
and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991) 
HW  Heidelberg Writings: Journal Publications, translated by Brady 
Bowman and Allen Speight (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009) 
LHP  Lectures on the History of Modern Philosophy 1825-6, Volume III: 
Medieval and Modern Philosophy, edited by Robert F. Brown, 
translated by R. F. Brown and J. M. Stewart (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 
PS The Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977) 
SL +HJHO¶V6FLHQFHRI/RJLF, translated by A. V. Miller (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1969) 
 
2
 &IDOVR6/µDeterminateness is negation ± is the absolute principle of 
6SLQR]D¶VSKLORVRSK\¶ 
 4 
 
Let us start with the simple notion of being and we shall see that it is 
inadequate. Nothing is simply without having some determinate quality. 
Simply being which was nothing but this, i.e., was neither animal, vegetable, 
nor mineral, etc., would be nothing. And this is the famous first argument of 
the logic: pure being turns out to be pure emptiness, nothing; and reciprocally, 
this nothing which is purely indeterminate is equivalent to pure being. Hence 
the notion of pure being frustrates its own purpose. We cannot characterize 
reality with it alone, and we are forced to move to a notion of being as 
determinate, as having some quality and not another. Being can only be 
thought as determinate. 
But this means that being and non-being are joined together; for the 
only way to characterize determinate being is in terms of some property, and 
property terms can only be made intelligible by being opposed, contrasted to 
each other. In this sense Hegel takes up the Spinozan principle that all 
determination is negation. (Taylor 1975: 232)3 
                                                          
3
 &IDOVR,QZRRGµHegel HQGRUVHV6SLQR]D¶VFODLPWKDW³GHWHUPLQDWLRQLV
QHJDWLRQ´«WKDWLVWKDWDWKLQJRUFRQFHSWLVGHWHUPLQDWHRQO\LQ virtue of a contrast 
with other things or concepts, which are determined in a way that it is not¶DQG
Brandom 2002: 178-µHegel starts the line of thought I will be rehearsing with the 
everyday idea of how things are ± the idea that there is some way the world is. 
Understanding how things are or might be is grasping a certain sort of content. And 
his first observation is that that content ± the way things are or could be taken to be ± 
must be determinate«'HWHUPLQDWHQHVVLVDPDWWHURILGHQWLW\DQGLQGLviduation. It 
FRQFHUQVKRZRQHWKLQJLVGLVWLQJXLVKHGIURPRWKHUV«+HJHOHPEUDFHVWKHPHGLHYDO
(and Spinozist) principle omnis determinatio est negatio.¶,WLVQRWRQO\FRQWHPSRUDU\
commentators who take this line: cf. also Sigwart 1895: volume 1, 126-7: 
µ«6SLQR]D¶VZHOO-NQRZQSURSRVLWLRQµ'HWHUPLQDWLRHVWQHJDWLR¶KDVEHHQPDGHXVH
of to express a view which goes so far as to transfer the negation into the nature of 
things themselves, thus ranking the negative judgment as the original expression of 
knowledge of these. Trendelenburg has right drawn attention to Thomas Campanella 
as one of the most decided supporters of the opinion that all things consist in yes and 
no, being and non-being; that everything is this particular thing only because it is not 
somethLQJHOVHµ0DQLV¶WKDWLVKLVDIILUPDWLRQ%XWKHLVRQO\PDQEHFDXVHKHLVQRW
stone, not lion, not donkey; hence he is at once being, and non-being. Spinoza has the 
VDPHPHDQLQJZKHQKHVD\Vµ'HWHUPLQDWLRHVWQHJDWLR¶DILJXUHLVGHWHUPLQHGLQVR
far as it is not the space surrounding it, and thus can be thought of only by the aid of 
negation ± as a limitation, i.e. QHJDWLRQRIWKHLQILQLWH«>%XW@LWLVRQO\E\DFRQVWDQW
confusion between negation in thought and those real relations in being which are 
very imperfectly expressed by mere negation that the Hegelian logic succeeds in 
SUHVHQWLQJLWDVDUHDOSRZHUDQGDVWKHQDWXUHRIWKLQJV«¶ 
 5 
  
In the secondary literature on Hegel, therefore, the idea that there is a positive 
connection between Hegel and Spinoza concerning this principle, notwithstanding 
their other differences, is well-entrenched. 
 But in fact, not everything is at it appears, where as we shall soon see, there 
are grounds for considerable doubt that Spinoza ever understood the principle in the 
way Hegel does. Now, of course, it has often been noted by Hegel scholars that he 
UHZRUGVWKHGLFWXPDV6SLQR]DQRZKHUHTXLWHZULWHVµRPQLVGHWHUPLQDWLRHVWQHJDWLR¶
± EXW WKLV LVIUHTXHQWO\MXVWSXWGRZQWR+HJHO¶VQRWRULRXVO\VORSS\KDELWV LQJLYLQJ
quotations, and so signifies little.4 Less frequently, some concern is expressed that 
SHUKDSV 6SLQR]D GLGQ¶W TXLWH PHDQ ZKDW +HJHO PHDQV EXW WKHQ WKLV LV QRW UHDOO\
explained or elaborated upon.5 And in just a few cases, it is pointed out in more detail 
WKDW6SLQR]D¶VSRVLWLRQLVWKHFRPSOHWHRSSRVLWHRI+HJHO¶V± where it is this view that 
I now wish to defend, but in a way which is more sympathetic to Hegel than those 
who normally propound this position, who generally see Hegel as blind to this fact, or 
if not blind to it himself, as deliberately trying to obscure it from his readers in order 
to make it easier for him to both co-opt and criticize Spinoza for his own purposes.6 
 
2. Spinoza on determination is negation 
Spinoza does not explicitly state the principle that determination is negation as such in 
his published writings, but in a letter to Jarig Jelles of 1674: 
 
With regard to the statement that figure is a negation and not anything 
positive, it is obvious that matter in its totality, considered without limitation 
[indefinitè consideratam], can have no figure, and that figure applies only to 
                                                          
4
 6HHHJWKHHGLWRUV¶QRWHVWR(/ZKHUHWKH\UHPDUNRQO\WKDWµ7KLVWDJZKLFK+HJHO
ORYHVLVDPLVTXRWDWLRQ¶(EL:326). 
5
 Cf. Moore 2012: 181-QRWHµ$WRQHSRLQW+HJHODSSURSULDWHV6SLQR]DDVDQ
DOO\FLWLQJZKDWKHFDOOV³WKHSURSRVLWLRQRI6SLQR]D´WKDWµomnis determinatio est 
QHJDWLR¶DOOGHWHUPLQDWLRQLVQHJDWLRQ«%XWLWLVIDUIURPFOHDULQZKDWKHJRes on to 
VD\DERXW6SLQR]DWKDWKHLVEHLQJIDLWKIXOWRKLP¶ 
6
 &I'XII\µ+HJHOQRWRQO\FKDQJHVWKHTXRWDWLRQWRVLPSOLI\LWIRUKLV
SXUSRVHVEXWLQKLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQKHDOVRGLVWRUWVLWV6SLQR]LVWLFPHDQLQJ¶ 
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finite and determinate bodies. For he who says that he apprehends a figure, 
thereby means to indicate simply this, that he apprehends a determinate thing 
and the manner of its determination. This determination therefore does not 
pertain to the thing in regard to its being; on the contrary, it is its non-being. 
So since figure is nothing but determination, and determination is negation 
[Quia ergo figura non aliud, quam determinatio, et determinatio negatio est], 
figure can be nothing other than negation, as has been said.7 
 
Nonetheless, the doctrine is also implied elsewhere, for example in Ethics 1p8s: 
 
As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infinite existence is the 
absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii) that 
every substance is necessarily infinite. 
 
What position is Spinoza putting forward here, and what is his argument for it? 
 A crucial background idea is to be found in Descartes, where he writes in his 
ILIWKVHWRIUHSOLHVWKDWµDOOOLPLWDWLRQLPSOLHVDQHJDWLRQRIWKHLQILQLWH¶8 With this in 
PLQGZHPLJKWVHWRXW6SLQR]D¶VDUJXPHQWLQWKH-HOOHVOHWWHUDVIROORZV 
 
 When we apprehend a finite thing, we see it as having a shape or figure. 
In so doing, we mark that thing off from other things, giving it a 
determination. 
But it only has being as part of the infinite matter from which it is now 
separated. 
So, its determination pertains to its non-being, not its being. 
                                                          
7
 In standard catalogues of SpLQR]D¶VFRUUHVSRQGHQFHWKLVLVFODVVLILHGDV/HWWHU
where I am using the translation given by Yitzhak Y. Melamed in Melamed 2012. 
The letter can be found in Spinoza 1925: Vol IV, p. 240. The letter is one of the few 
Spinoza originally wrote in Dutch, where a Dutch version was printed in 1677 in 
Spinoza's Nagelate schriften (the Dutch edition of the Posthumous Works); but since 
Spinoza's Dutch was rather clumsy, this was revised by the editors. Still, it will be 
closer to what Spinoza actually wrote than the Latin translation given in the Opera 
posthuma, which Paulus took for his source text. The phrase 4XLD« determinatio 
negatio est µDVGHWHUPLQDWLRQLVQHJDWLRQ¶) correctly renders 'HZLMOGDQ«EHSDOLQJ
ontkenning is. I am grateful to Piet Steenbakkers for this information. 
8
 Descartes 1964-76: 7:365.  
 7 
So, as determination is a negation of being, and figure is a form of 
determination, figure is a negation. 
 
,WVHHPVFUXFLDO WR6SLQR]D¶VYLHZWKHUHIRUH WKDWGHWHUPLQDWLRQLVDQHJDWLRQLQWKH
sense that it is a privation or taking away of being, as we move from the infinite to the 
finite.9 This, certainly, is the point that is stressed by F. H. Jacobi, who did so much to 
generate interest in Spinoza in eighteenth century Germany: 
 
Determinatio est negatio, seu determinatio ad rem juxta suum esse non 
pertinent [Determination is negation, i.e. determination does not pertain to a 
thing according to its being]. Individual things therefore, so far as they only 
exist in a certain determinate mode, are non-entia; the indeterminate infinite 
being is the one single true ens reale, hoc est, est omne esse, & praeter quod 
nullum datur est [this is the real being; it is the all of being, and apart from it 
there is no being]. (Jacobi 1785: §XII, p. 131; translated Jacobi 1994: 219-20) 
 
 But now we are faced by our puzzle, namely that Spinoza seems to take 
µGHWHUPLQDWLRQ LV QHJDWLRQ¶ LQ D ZD\ WKDW LV RSSRVLWH WR +HJHO ZKHUHDV KH WKLQNV
determination through negation is necessary for being in any real sense, Spinoza 
thinks determination though negation relates to the non-being of what is determined 
in this way. Far from being at one on this issue, therefore, Hegel and Spinoza seem to 
be as far apart as possible. But if this is right, why did Hegel claim that his way of 
WDNLQJµGHWHUPLQDWLRQLVQHJDWLRQ¶LVµWKHSURSRVLWLRQRI6SLQR]D¶"± where it is Hegel 
himself who seems to have misled many of his commentators here, who not 
unnaturally have taken his word for how things stood in relation to Spinoza. 
 I will now consider some possible answers to this puzzle. 
 
3. Hegel and Spinoza on determination is negation 
                                                          
9
 &I/HWWHUWR+XGGHµVLQFHGHWHUPLQDWLRQGHQRWHVQRWKLQJSRVLWLYHEXWRQO\D
privation in the nature of existence which is conceived as determinate, it follows that 
that which by definition affirmVH[LVWHQFHFDQQRWEHFRQFHLYHGRIDVGHWHUPLQDWH¶
(Spinoza 1925: vol IV, p. 184). 
 8 
A first, and most obvious, answer it that perhaps Hegel just misread Spinoza, and just 
GLVWRUWHGWKHODWWHU¶VPHDQLQJWKURXJKLJQRUDQFH7KLVKRZHYHULVQRWYHU\SODXVLEOH
for two main reasons. 
 First, Hegel was very familiar with -DFREL¶VZULWLQJVRQ6SLQR]DDQGDVZH
KDYHVHHQ-DFREL¶VDFFRXQWJHWV6SLQR]D¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKLVPDWWHUULJKWVRDWWKHYHU\
least Hegel would have been exposed to an account very different from his own, 
rather than slipping into this through lack of awareness. Indeed, in his review of the 
WKLUG YROXPH RI -DFREL¶V Works published in the Heidelberger Jahrbücher der 
Literatur in 1817, Hegel comments on this principle in relation to Jacobi, suggesting 
that he would have been perfectly well aware of the laWWHU¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILW10 
 Second, and even more significantly, in many of his own writings on Spinoza, 
+HJHOKLPVHOIRIIHUVDUHDGLQJRIWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWLVFORVHUWR6SLQR]D¶VRZQ± and 
moreover uses it to criticise Spinoza for thereby ending up with a monistic view of 
substance as a kind of Parmenidean one. This suggests that Hegel was perfectly well 
aware of how Spinoza meant the principle to be understood, as can be seen, for 
example, in this passage from the lectures on the history of philosophy: 
 
With regard to the determinate, Spinoza established this thesis: omnis 
determinatio est negatio. Hence only the non-particularized or the universal is. 
It alone is what is substantial and therefore truly actual. As a singular thing, 
the soul or the mind is something limited. It is by negation that a singular 
thing is. Therefore [the singular thing] does not have genuine actuality. This 
RQWKHZKROHLV6SLQR]D¶VLGHD«:KDWGLIIHUHQWLDWHVDQGIRUPVWKHSDUWLFXODU
is said to be just a modification of the absolute substance and nothing actual in 
its own self. The operation upon it is just the stripping away of its 
determination or particularity, so that it can be thrown back into the one 
                                                          
10
 6HHµ5HYLHZRI)ULHGULFK+HLQULFK-DFREL¶V:RUNV9ROXPH,,,¶+:-9). 
This view of the principle seems not to have been uncommon at the time, perhaps 
because of -DFREL¶VLQIOXHQFHVHHHJ6FKHOOLQJ¶VUHIHUHQFHWRLWLQKLVPhilosophical 
Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (1809), where again he argues that 
µGHWHUPLQDWLRQDVQHJDWLRQ¶GRHVQRWDSSO\WRDQLQWHOOLJLEOHEHLQJVLQFHWKH
determinateness LWKDVµUHDOO\LVWKHHVVHQFHLQLWVEHLQJ¶6FKHOOLQJ-61: 385; 
translated Schelling 2006: 50). 
 9 
absolute substance. This is what is unsatisfying in Spinoza. (Hegel 1986: 104-
5 (LHP:121-2))11 
 
Hegel therefore shows himself to have been perfectly capable of offering a reading of 
the principle that was very different from his own way of using it, and of attributing 
this reading to Spinoza. 
 Moreover, in these discussions of Spinoza, where he sees value in the 
principle, it is not because he reads it his way, but because he reads it as Spinoza 
LQWHQGHGVRIRU+HJHOZKDWPDNHVWKHSULQFLSOHVLJQLILFDQWLQ6SLQR]D¶VKDQGVLVQRW
in showing that it can be used as an argument against Parmenidean monism, but 
because it establishes that the finite is not itself absolute, but must relate to the infinite 
qua substance ± where this is a view that Hegel himself endorses.12 Of course, and as 
we shall discuss further, Hegel also thinks Spinoza gets this relation between the 
finite and infinite wrong in certain fundamental ways, in giving too much weight to 
the latter over the former ± but still, where he deserves credit, and where the 
µGHWHUPLQDWLRQLVQHJDWLRQ¶SULQFLSOHGRHVJRRGZRUNLs in taking a step in the right 
direction: 
 
7KLV LGHDRI6SLQR]D¶VPXVWEHDFNQRZOHGJHG WREH WUXHDQGZHOO-grounded. 
There is an absolute substance, and it is what is true. But it is not yet the whole 
truth, for substance must also be thought of as inwardly active and alive, and 
LQ WKDW ZD\ PXVW GHWHUPLQH LWVHOI DV VSLULW 6SLQR]D¶V VXEVWDQFH LV WKH
XQLYHUVDO DQG FRQVHTXHQWO\ WKH DEVWUDFW GHWHUPLQDWLRQ« ,I WKLQNLQJ VWRSV
with this substance, there is then no development, no life, no spirituality or 
                                                          
11
 Cf. also 6:198 (SL:538-ZKHUH+HJHOFRPSDUHV6SLQR]D¶VYLHZWRWKDWRIµWKH
oriental conception of emanation¶ZKHUHWKHFRPLQJLQWREHLQJRIZKDWHPanates 
IURPWKHDEVROXWHLVVHHQµRQO\DVDSURJUHVVLYHORVV¶DQGDOVR6/ZKHUH
although Spinoza is not mentioned by name, it is arguable that Hegel had him in 
PLQGµ«LQreality as quality with the accent on being, the fact is concealed that it 
contains determinateness and therefore also negation. Consequently, reality is given 
the value only of something positive from which negation, limitation and deficiency 
[Mangel] are excluded. Negation as mere deficiency would be equivalent to nothing; 
but it is a determinate being, a quality, only determined with a non-EHLQJ¶ 
12
 Cf. Hegel 5:172 (SL:154): µ7KHSURSRVLWLRQWKDWWKHILQLWHLVLGHDO>ideell] 
constitutes idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in 
recognizing that the finite has no veritable being [wahrhaft Seiendes@¶ 
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activity. So we can say that with Spinozism everything goes into the abyss but 
nothing emerges from it. (Hegel 1986: 104-5 (LHP:122))13 
What is remarkable here is that Hegel sees the context for the principle not as refuting 
monism, but as something much more Spinozistic, again suggesting that he knew well 
how Spinoza intended it to be taken, and how this differed from his own approach. So 
it seems, we cannot hope to resolve our interpretative puzzle by holding that Hegel 
ZDVXQIDPLOLDUZLWK6SLQR]D¶VWKLQNLQJLQ this area, and so got the attribution wrong 
through ignorance. In fact, our puzzle is now deepened yet further: given that he knew 
6SLQR]D¶VSRVLWLRQSHUIHFWO\ZHOOZK\GLGKHSUHVHQWKLVYHU\GLIIHUHQWXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of the principle as following in SpinR]D¶VIRRWVWHSV" 
 Here, a second answer might be offered: namely, that while Hegel thinks his 
own way of understanding the principle is a great insight, and while he recognized 
WKDW LW LV YHU\ GLIIHUHQW IURP 6SLQR]D¶V PDQQHU RI WDNLQJ LW QRQHWKHOHVV 6SLQR]D¶V
HDUOLHU FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH SULQFLSOH PDGH KLV RZQ SRVVLEOH ZKLFK LV ZK\ µRPQLV
GHWHUPLQDWLRHVWQHJDWLR¶VWLOOGHVHUYHVWREHFDOOHGµWKHSURSRVLWLRQRI6SLQR]D¶HYHQ
WKRXJK+HJHO¶VYLHZRILWGLYHUJHVIURPWKHRQH6SLQR]DKLPVHOIDGRSWHG 
 Now, as we have just seen, this approach might fit the discussions where 
Hegel is reading the principle in a Spinozistic manner, where (in a way that is 
characteristic of his attitude to his predecessors) Hegel does seem to acknowledge that 
Spinoza was on to something important about how the infinite relates to the finite, but 
ZDVWRRµRQH-VLGHG¶LQKRZKHYLHZHGWKDWUHODWLRQ6RLQWKLVFRQWH[WLWPDNHVVHQVH
to think of Hegel giving Spinoza some credit as a trail-blazer.14 But, when Hegel is 
using the principle as part of his refutation of Parmenidean monism, to claim that 
EHLQJ UHTXLUHVQHJDWLRQ WKLVSRVLWLRQ MXVW VHHPV WRRGLVWDQW IURP6SLQR]D¶VYLHZ WR
                                                          
13
 &IDOVR6/µ>,@WLVVXIILFLHQWO\LPSRUWDQWWKDWLQWKLVQHFHVVDU\QRWLRQ
>RI6SLQR]D¶VVXEVWDQFH@HYHU\WKLQJZKLFKWRQDWXUDOSLFWXUHWKLQNLQJRUWRWKH
understanding with its fixed distinctions, appears and is vaguely present as something 
self-subsistent, is completely reduced to a mere positedness. Determinateness is 
negation ± LVWKHDEVROXWHSULQFLSOHRI6SLQR]D¶VSKLORVRSK\WKLVWUXHDQGVLPSOH
insight establishes the absolute uniW\RIVXEVWDQFH¶ 
14
 &I6/µDeterminateness is negation ± is the absolute principle of 
6SLQR]D¶VSKLORVRSK\WKLVWUXHDQGVLPSOHLQVLJKWHVWDEOLVKHVWKHDEVROXWHXQLW\RI
substance. But Spinoza stops short at negation as determinateness or quality; he does 
not advance to a cognition of negation as absolute, that is, self-negating, negation; 
thus his substance does not itself contain the absolute form, and cognition of it is not 
DQLPPDQHQWFRJQLWLRQ¶ 
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count as something the latter saw, albeit dimly ± on the contrary, as we have been 
HPSKDVLVLQJ LW GRHVQ¶W VHHP WR EH 6SLQR]D¶V YLHZ LQ DQ\ ZD\ DW DOO15 So, 
QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ+HJHO¶V IRQGQHVV IRUILQGLQJDSODFHIRUDOOKLVSUHGHFHVVRUVZLWKLQ
the big Hegelian tent, it would seem implausible to claim that this was his intention in 
claiming that the principle used iQ +HJHO¶V ZD\ LV VWLOO VRPHKRZ D GHVFHQGHQW RI
6SLQR]D¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILWIRUZKLFK6SLQR]DGHVHUYHVDFNQRZOHGJHPHQW 
 It would seem, then, that to resolve our interpretative puzzle, a more radical 
suggestion is required, which I now want to put forward as the right one: namely, that 
while Hegel undoubtedly held the doctrine that determination requires negation and 
that being requires determination, nonetheless when he himself actually refers to the 
µGHWHUPLQDWLRQLVQHJDWLRQ¶SULQFLSOHKHDFWXDOO\PHDnt it not in this sense, but rather 
LQ6SLQR]D¶V± hence making it less surprising that he should attribute this principle to 
6SLQR]DDVLQWKHFRQWH[WVZKHQKHGRHVVRKHZDVHPSOR\LQJLWLQ6SLQR]D¶VZD\ 
 Clearly, to make this plausible, we need to look again at the places where 
Hegel mentions Spinoza in the context of his own arguments against pure being, and 
thus in a way that has suggested he thought that Spinoza understood the principle in 
his Hegelian manner; I will now argue that while Hegel does indeed mention Spinoza 
LQ WKHVH GLVFXVVLRQV KH QRQHWKHOHVV GRHV VR ZKHQ XVLQJ WKH SULQFLSOH LQ 6SLQR]D¶V
way, not his own, so that the puzzle can be dissolved by taking this approach. 
 The first and most important passage to be considered, therefore, comes from 
the Science of Logic which we cited previously, where the key sentence is: 
µ'HWHUPLQDWHQHVV LV QHJDtion posited as affirmative ± this is the proposition of 
Spinoza: omnis determinatio est negatio¶ >µ'LH %HVWLPPWKHLW LVW GLH 1HJDWLRQ DOV
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 This is my worry concerning the solution to the puzzle recently offered by Yitzhak 
<0HODPHGLQKLV0HODPHGµ7KDWFODXVH>DWWKHHQGRI6SLQR]D¶VOHWWHUWR
Jelles] was to be adopted by Hegel and transformed into the slogan of his own 
dialectical method: Omnis determinatio est negatio ³(YHU\GHWHUPLQDWLRQLV
QHJDWLRQ´2IIXUWKHUVLJQLILFDQFHLVWKHIDFWWKDWZKLOH+HJHOGRHVFUHGLW6SLQR]D
with the discovery of this most fundamental insight, he believes Spinoza failed to 
DSSUHFLDWHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIKLVGLVFRYHU\¶%XWDVZHKDYHVHHQ+HJHO¶VRZQ
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHVORJDQLVVRGLIIHUHQWIURP6SLQR]D¶VWKDWLWZRXOGMXVWDSSHDU
perverse for Hegel to claim that Spinoza deserves any credit for it, or that his own 
SRVLWLRQLVDGHYHORSPHQWRI6SLQR]D¶VLQWKLVUHVSHFW$V0HODPHGKLPVHOIQRWHVµWKH
GLDOHFWLFDOUHDGLQJFRQIOLFWVH[SOLFLWO\ZLWKVRPHRI6SLQR]D¶VGHHSHVWPHWDSK\VLFDO
SULQFLSOHV¶DQGVRKHLVIRUFHGWRFODLPWKDW+HJHOZDVµXQDZDUH¶RIWKLVVHHS
but this seems unlikely, for reasons give above. 
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affirmativ gesetzt ± ist der Satz des Spinoza: Omnis determinatio est negatio¶].16 Now 
RIFRXUVHWKLVFRXOGPHDQµQHJDWLRQLVVRPHWKLQJDIILUPDWLYHVRPHWKLQJWKDWHQDEOHV
WKLQJV WR EH¶ ZKLFK ZRXOG EH WKH VWDQGDUG QRQ-Spinozistic reading, which then 
makes it hard WRVHHKRZLWFDQEHFDOOHGµWKHSURSRVLWLRQRI6SLQR]D¶%XW,VXJJHVW
the sentence could also be read a different way, when we take into account the 
paragraph that comes before it. In that paragraph, Hegel has spoken about conceiving 
UHDOLW\DVµWKHDEsolute power LQZKLFKHYHU\WKLQJGHWHUPLQDWHLVDEVRUEHG¶DQGZLWK
it all negations, which is thus to have an affirmative view of reality itself according to 
which determinateness is treated as a privation. This, I suggest, means that we should 
read Hegel¶V SUREOHPDWLF VHQWHQFH DV VD\LQJ WKDW RQ 6SLQR]D¶V YLHZ RI
determinateness, negation can be viewed in conjunction with an affirmative view of 
reality and thus is posited by Spinoza in this manner, as it is taken as a deprivation of 
that reality qua absolute power, by being a limitation of what is. Thus, while on 
6SLQR]D¶VYLHZGHWHUPLQDWLRQLVDQHJDWLRQLWJRHVDORQJZLWKDQDIILUPDWLYHYLHZRI
reality as such, for while it involves privation, it relates to a metaphysics of 
affirmation. This, then, which would give us a Spinozistic view of this sentence and 
KHQFHPDNH LWXQSUREOHPDWLF IRU+HJHO WKHQ WR VD\ WKDW WKLV LV DYLHZRI6SLQR]D¶V
because it is. 
 What is to be said in favour of this reading? First, it resolves our interpretative 
puzzle. Second, LWVHHPVWRILW+HJHO¶VDFWXDOZRUGVZLWKRXWWRUWXULQJWKHP%XWWKHUH
is also a third reason, which is that it makes sense of what Hegel says in the paragraph 
that immediately follows this sentence: 
 
Of this proposition that determinateness is negation, the unity of 
6SLQR]D¶V VXEVWDQFH ± or that there is only one substance ± is the necessary 
consequence. Thought and being or extension, the two attributes, namely, 
which Spinoza had before him, he had of necessity to posit as one in this 
unity; for as determinate realities they are negations whose infinity is their 
XQLW\ $FFRUGLQJ WR 6SLQR]D¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI ZKLFK PRUH VXEVHTXHQWO\ WKH
infinity of anything is its affirmation. He grasped them therefore as attributes, 
that is, as not having a separate existence, a self-subsistent being of their own, 
but only as sublated, as moments; or rather, since substance in its own self 
                                                          
16
 5:120-1 (SL:113); translation modified. 
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lacks any determination whatever, they are for him not even moments, and the 
attributes like the modes are distinctions made by an external intellect. (Hegel 
5:121 (SL:113)) 
 
1RZ WDNLQJ µGHWHUPLQDWLRQ LV QHJDWLRQ¶ LQ WKH+HJHOLDQ ZD\ LW LV KDUG WR VHH KRZ
µWKHXQLW\RI6SLQR]D¶VVXEVWDQFH± RUWKDWWKHUHLVRQO\RQHVXEVWDQFH¶FRXOGEHWKH
µQHFHVVDU\FRQVHTXHQFH¶IRUWKH+HJHOLDQZD\RI taking this principle is just the idea 
that determination comes about through difference, where it is not at all clear why it 
should follow from this that a unified substance follows from it in a Spinozistic 
manner.17 However, if we take the principle itself as used here in an equally 
Spinozistic way, this claim makes much more sense, and in fact is in line with the 
passages from the lectures in the history of philosophy: namely, that if determination 
is the negation of a prior affirmative being, this affirmative being itself lacks any 
internal difference and determinacy, so there is no determinate difference between its 
attributes; they are therefore distinguished only by an external intellect and substance 
in itself remains an undifferentiated unity or one7KHXQLW\RI6SLQR]D¶V VXEVWDQFH
thus follows directly from the idea that determination is negation, if we take that idea 
LQ6SLQR]D¶VZD\7KHORJLFRI+HJHO¶VGLVFXVVLRQKHUHWKHUHIRUHVHHPVWRUHTXLUHWKDW
                                                          
17
 One commentator who does try to connect this paragraph to an Hegelian reading of 
WKHSULQFLSOHLV'HDQ0R\DUZKHUHKHJORVVHV+HJHO¶VDUJXPHQWDVIROORZVµ:KHQ
Hegel cites Spinoza on this point, he holds that an immediate inference from this 
claim is that there is only one all-encompassing substance, a totality within which 
everything can be determined by negation. This point too can easily be made intuitive, 
though its full metaphysical implications are obviously much harder to grasp. 
Negation only individuates something if we have an exhaustive grasp of the entities in 
question. Determining (classifying) something by negating all the things that contrast 
with it only succeeds if a complete negation is possible, which is the case only if we 
know what all the entities that stand in relation to the entity in question are. If the 
whole of the entities is not a closed system or totality, such individuation through 
QHJDWLRQZLOOEHLPSRVVLEOH¶0R\DU-29). It is noteable, however, that none 
of the argumentative moves Moyar makes here are in the text itself, particularly the 
thought that for us to classify something, these things must form part of a totality. 
Moreover, the argument itself seems weak: why should the individuation of a thing 
through negation require that we KDYHDQH[KDXVWLYHJUDVSRILW":K\FRXOGQ¶WWKH
difference between A and everything that is not-A make it the case that A is an 
individual, even if we lack full knowledge of all the things that make A different from 
what it is not? And of course, in attributing to Hegel a non-Spiniozistic reading of the 
principle immediately before, Moyar walks straight into the interpretative puzzle we 
are trying to resolve, which he seems not to be aware of at all. 
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ZH UHDG KLV XVH RI WKH µGHWHUPLQDWLRQ LV QHJDWLRQ¶ SULQFLSOH in this context as 
Spinozistic, even if elsewhere he used it for his own purposes in a different way. 
 Indeed, not only does this following paragraph seem to require this approach; 
VRGRHVWKHVHQWHQFHZKLFKIROORZV+HJHO¶VUHIHUHQFHWRWKH principle, which goes like 
this: 
 
Determinateness is negation posited as affirmative - this is the proposition of 
Spinoza: omnis determinatio est negatio. This proposition is infinitely 
important; only, negation as such is formless abstraction [nur ist die Negation 
als solche  die formlose Abstraktion]. 
 
,ZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDWWKHFODXVHµRQO\QHJDWLRQDVVXFKLVIRUPOHVVDEVWUDFWLRQ¶DJDLQ
fits with my reading, as a warning against the Spinozistic approach suggested in the 
first sentence, namely, that for Spinoza on his way of taking the principle, negation is 
WUHDWHGDVQRPRUHWKDQDIRUPOHVVDEVWUDFWLRQZKLOHRQ+HJHO¶VZD\LWLVQRW± again 
signaling that Hegel is intending the principle to be read here in a Spinozistic manner, 
not his own. 
 +HJHO¶VRWher main discussion of Spinoza in the Science of Logic may also be 
handled in a comparable way.18 +HUHDIWHUZULWLQJWKDWµDeterminateness is negation 
± LV WKH DEVROXWH SULQFLSOH RI 6SLQR]D¶V SKLORVRSK\¶ +HJHO JRHV RQ µWKLV WUXH DQG
simple insight establLVKHV WKH DEVROXWH XQLW\ RI VXEVWDQFH¶ $JDLQ DV LQ WKH HDUOLHU
GLVFXVVLRQ WKLV VHFRQG UHPDUN RQO\ UHDOO\ PDNHV VHQVH LI ZH WDNH +HJHO¶V
understanding of the principle here to be the Spinozistic one, as it is only from that 
WKDWWKHµDEVROXWHXQLW\¶RI6SLQR]D¶VVXEVWDQFHUHDOO\IROORZV19 
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 See 6:195 (SL:536). 
19
 7KHVDPHPD\EHVDLGRI+HJHO¶VUHIHUHQFHWRWKLVSULQFLSOHLQKLV-DFRELUHYLHZ
ZKHUH+HJHODUJXHVWKDWLIZHDUHWRDYRLGDµPRWLRQOHVV¶DQGPRQLVWLF6SLQR]LVWLF
VXEVWDQFHµ(YHU\WKLQJGHSHQGVKHUHRQDFRUUHFWXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHVWDWXs and 
VLJQLILFDQFHRIQHJDWLYLW\¶,IZHIROORZ6SLQR]DDQGQHJDWLYLW\LVµWDNHQRQO\WREH
the determinateness of finite things (omnis determinatio est negatio¶WKHQµQHJDWLRQ
fails to be seen as internal to the infinite or internal to substance¶ZKHUe I would 
XQGHUVWDQG+HJHO¶VSRVLWLRQKHUHDVIROORZVLIQHJDWLRQLVWDNHQLQ6SLQR]D¶VZD\DV
a deprivation belonging to finite things, then the infinite cannot be conceived of as 
differentiated, in a way that Hegel criticizes Spinoza for in the previous paragraph; 
this only becomes possible if negation is understood in the manner that Hegel himself 
SURSRVHVDVµDQLQWHUQDOSULQFLSOHRIVHSDUDWLRQLQVXEVWDQFHLWVHOI¶ZKHUHE\LWJLYHV
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 We may also look at the troublesome passage from the Encyclopedia Logic, 
which again I suggest can be dealt with in a similar manner. The crucial sentence 
IURP = LV µ7KH EDVLV RI DOO GHWHUPLQDF\ LV QHJDWLRQ omnis determinatio est 
negatio DV 6SLQR]D VD\V¶ :KLOH VWDQGDUGO\ UHDG DV PDNLQJ WKH FODLP WKDW 6SLQR]D
VKDUHV+HJHO¶VYLHZ UHJDUGLQJ WKH UHODWLRQEHWZHHQGHWHUPLQDWLRQDQGQHJDWLRQ WKH
VHQWHQFH WKDW IROORZV LQ IDFW VXJJHVWV RWKHUZLVH µ8QWKLQNLQJ RSLQLRQ FRQVLGers 
GHWHUPLQDWH WKLQJV WREHPHUHO\SRVLWLYH DQGKROGV WKHP IDVW LQ WKH IRUPRIEHLQJ¶
7KLV LW VHHPV LV PDNLQJ D 6SLQR]LVWLF SRLQW DJDLQVW µXQWKLQNLQJ RSLQLRQ >GDV
JHGDQNHQORVH 0HLQHQ@¶ ZKLFK PLVWDNHQO\ KROGV WKDW RUGLQDU\ ILQLWH HQWLWLHV DUH DOO
that LV UHDO DQGDUH µSRVLWLYH¶ LQ WKHLURZQ ULJKW ZLWKRXW OLNH6SLQR]D UHFRJQL]LQJ
that they are in fact a negation of a larger totality, where it is this Spinozistic point 
WKDWLVWDNHQXSLQ+HJHO¶VFODLPWKDWµWKHILQLWHLVLGHDO¶+HUHDJDLQWKHQWKH context 
RI+HJHO¶VUHIHUHQFHWRWKHµGHWHUPLQDWLRQLVQHJDWLRQ¶SULQFLSOHVXJJHVWVWKDWKHUHKH
was using it in a way similar to Spinoza ± which then of course dispels the mystery 
that he should refer to Spinoza at just this point, notwithstanding his different take on 
the principle when it is used elsewhere. 
 It seems, then, that a solution to our interpretative puzzle has been found. 
 
4. The British Idealists on determination is negation 
I now want to turn to consider the way in which the British Idealists understood the 
position of Spinoza and Hegel on these issues, as I think this also sheds an interesting 
light on the puzzle we have discussed. 
 As we shall see, many of the British Idealists referred to the principle, and of 
course many of them were familiar with the work of Spinoza as well as Hegel.20 As 
we shall also see, it also turns out that the principle is relevant to a significant 
divergence within British Idealism between monists (such as F. H. Bradley) and 
critics who accused British Idealism of monism or anti-individualism (such as 
Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison), and those who defended a more holistic position (such 
as John and Edward Caird). For, if the principle is taken in a Spinozistic way, it can 
provide an argument for monism, by suggesting that the finite is no more than a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
LWVHOIEHLQJUDWKHUWKDQKDYLQJLWWDNHQDZD\6HHµ5HYLHZRI)ULHGrich Heinrich 
-DFREL¶V:RUNV9ROXPH,,,¶-5 (HW: 8-9). 
20
 For some background discussion, see Parkinson 1993 and Mander 2011: 69-73. 
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µIDOOLQJ DZD\¶ IURP WKH IXQGDPHQWDO UHDOLW\ RI DQ LQILQLWH EHLQJ ZKLFK LV LWVHOI
undifferentiated. On the other hand, if the principle is taken in a more Hegelian way, 
it can provide a defense against this same monism, by suggesting that in lacking in 
negation it would also like in the determination necessary to distinguish it from 
nothing; but at the same time, the principle still allows for the infinite to be related to 
the finite in a dialectical manner of some sort, leading to a kind of dynamic holism, of 
WKH VRUW IDPRXVO\ VXJJHVWHG LQ +HJHO¶V VXJJHVWLRQ LQ WKH 3UHIDFH WR WKH
Phenomenology, that the absolute needs to be conceived not only as substance, but 
also as subject.21 
 Now, precisely because different readings of the principle were used to defend 
different positions, the British Idealists fully recognized that when Spinoza used the 
principle, it was not in defense of the Hegelian position that being requires 
determination, and thus that the latter view should not be taken as a Spinozistic 
GRFWULQH$VDUHVXOWWKHUHIRUHPHWDSK\VLFDOKROLVWVOLNHWKH&DLUGVWUHDWHG6SLQR]D¶V
use of the principle as problematic, much as Hegel himself does in his lectures, as we 
have seen. So, they argues, while there are some tendencies in Spinoza that pull 
against this, in the end Spinoza must end up in an excessively monistic position that 
ultimately renders his position unstable and the tensions will less monistic aspects of 
his thought unresolved ± so that in the end, his position needs to move into a form of 
more stable and satisfactory Hegelianism. 
 This approach can be seen clearly in the following passage from John Caird: 
 
>6SLQR]D¶V@ SKLORVRSK\ LV QRW D FRPSOHWHO\ KRPRJHQHRXV SURGXFW ,W PD\
rather be said to be the composite result of conflicting tendencies, neither of 
ZKLFK LV IROORZHG RXW WR LWV XWPRVW ORJLFDO UHVXOWV«There are parts of his 
system ± such as the reduction of all finite individuals to modes or accidents 
of the absolute substance, and the assertion that all determination is negation ± 
in which the idea of the infinite is so emphasised as to leave no place for the 
finite, or to reduce nature and man, all individual existences, to unreality and 
LOOXVLRQ7KHUHDUHSDUWVRIKLVV\VWHPRQWKHRWKHUKDQG«ZKLFKVHHPWo give 
to the finite an independent reality that leaves no room for the infinite, or 
                                                          
21
 Cf. 3:22-3 (PS:9-µLQP\YLHZZKLFKFDQEHMXVWLILHGRQO\E\WKHH[SRVLWLRQRI
the system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as 
Substance, but equally as Subject¶ 
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UHGXFHVLWWRDQH[SUHVVLRQIRUWKHDJJUHJDWHRIILQLWHWKLQJV«>7@KHRSSRVLWH
tendencies by which his mind is governed seem to receive alternate 
expression; but to the last they remain side by side, with no apparent 
consciousness of their disharmony, and with no attempt to mediate between 
them. (J. Caird 1888: 3-5) 
&DLUG WDNHV 6SLQR]D¶V DSSURDFK WR WKH GRFWULQH RI µGHWHUPLQDWLRQ LV QHJDWLRQ¶ DV
V\PSWRPDWLFRI6SLQR]D¶VXQGerlying difficulties: 
  
Spinoza is often greater than his method. There are parts of his system which 
LW LV LPSRVVLEOH WR UHFRQFLOH ZLWK WKH FDWHJRULHV WKDW LQ JHQHUDO JXLGH KLP«
One of these points is his identification of the infinite with the purely 
affirmative, of the finite or determined with the negative. [Then quotes letter 
DQGUHODWHGWH[WV@«,QWKHVHSDVVDJHVWKHLQIOXHQFHRIZKDWPD\EHWHUPHG
a geometrical conception of the universe is obvious.  When we withdraw the 
arbitrary limits which distinguish the finite from the infinite, what we reach is 
simply that which is free from all limits or determinations, the absolutely 
indeterminate; and as determinations are merely negations, the removal of all 
negations leaves us in the presence of non-negation, or of pure, absolute 
affirmation. As the very essence of the finite is non esse, privation or negation 
of being, so the essence of the infinite is simply pure Being, that which is, or 
that which cannot be conceived save as existing, seeing its very nature is one 
with existence. We see, therefore, in so far as this part of his system is 
FRQFHUQHG WKHQDUURZLQJ LQIOXHQFHRI6SLQR]D¶VPHWKRG7KHFRQFHSWLRQRI
things on which that method is based excludes any other alternative than that 
of determination or indetermination. It excludes, in other words, another 
possible alternative ± viz., that of self-determination, that is, of an affirmation 
which does not simply annul, but subsumes and includes negation. Yet the 
way to this alternative lay open to Spinoza when he had reached the last result 
which his method could yield. For an affirmation which is reached by 
negation, cannot ignore it. Apart from negation pure affirmation has no 
meaning. A negative element enters into its very essence. In itself, like the 
conception of pure space on which it is based, it is a mere abstraction; it needs 
the negative or determinate as its correlate. And when we have reached this 
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point, we have got beyond the contradictory elements of negation and 
affirmation to an idea which includes both. Thus the infinite, in the highest 
sense of the word, must be conceived not as the simple negation of the finite, 
EXW DV WKDW ZKLFK DW RQFH GHQLHV DQG DIILUPV LW« +DG 6SLQR]D WDNHQ WKLV
further step, it would have implied the reconstruction of his whole system. (J. 
Caird 1888: 120-4) 
 
Other Idealist commentators on Spinoza take a similar view, such as Edward Caird 
and H. H. Joachim.22 So, for several of the British Idealists with interests in both 
Hegel and Spinoza, they recognized how SpinozD¶V SULQFLSOH WKDW GHWHUPLQDWLRQ LV
QHJDWLRQVKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRGZLWKLQWKHODWWHU¶VSKLORVRSK\UDWKHUWKDQUHDGLQJKLV
position in Hegelian terms as many contemporary commentators do; and they also 
argued that precisely because of this, it causes problems from an Hegelian 
                                                          
22
 Cf. E. Caird 1889: vol 1, pp. 75-6: 
The principle already laid down by Descartes, but seen in its full bearing only by 
Spinoza, that omnis determinatio est negatio, i.e., that all definition and determination 
is the limitation of a presupposed positive being by a negation or an unreality, led 
directly to the conclusion that the only thing real in the proper sense of the word is 
that being which is absolutely indeterminate, without distinction or limit; and that the 
only truth which is unmixed with illusion is the thought which apprehends such 
EHLQJ«6SLQR]DVWUXJJOHVDJDLQVWWKLVUHVXOW«%XWKHQHYHUVDZWKHGLVWLQFWLRQ
between these two conceptions of the ultimate unLW\«7RVHHWKLQJVsub specie 
aeternitatis is simply to forget a difference which is found to be as hard and insoluble 
as ever, when we return to it again. It is like a Sunday confession that the things of the 
world are naught, while we treat them as absolute realities all the other days of the 
week. 
and  
Joachim 1901: 104-5:  
[T]he moments of the conception [of God], as Spinoza defines them, are 
irreconcilable ± that there is an inner contradiction in his conception of God. God is 
conceived by him as absolutely positive because absolutely real: as excluding all 
negation from his being. And this exclusion of negation or determination conflicts 
with the conception of God as comprehending all the ultimate characters of 
affirmative being within himself. This is the general conclusion to which, I think, we 
PXVWFRPH« 
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perspective, by leading Spinoza into a Parmenidean monism, no matter how much 
other aspects of his thought may have meant that he wanted to resist this. 
 On the other hand, other British Idealists who were apparently attracted to 
somethLQJ UHVHPEOLQJ VXFK PRQLVP RU ZKR ZHUHQ¶W EXW QRQHWKHOHVV IHDUHG WKDW
idealism must succumb to it, tended to view the Spinozistic conception of the 
principle as the right one to adopt.  
 $ FDVH LQ SRLQW LV %UDGOH\ :KLOH KH GRHVQ¶W FLWH WKH SULQFLSOH RU Uefer to 
6SLQR]D LQ WKLV FRQWH[W LW LV DUJXDEOH WKDW KH ZDV FORVH WR 6SLQR]D¶V ZD\ RI
understanding the doctrine, in holding that all differentiation is a form of falsification 
RI WKHXQGHUO\LQJXQLW\ RI WKHZKROH2IFRXUVH IRU%UDGOH\ WKLVGRHVQ¶WPHDQ that 
WKLVXQGHUO\LQJXQLW\LVDPHUHµRQH¶DVKHDOVRZDQWVWRDOORZWKDWLWFRQWDLQVVRPH
GLYHUVLW\+RZHYHU%UDGOH\¶VFULWLFVVXFKDV3ULQJOH-Pattison feared that he could not 
consistently maintain this position, any more than could Spinoza. This point emerges 
clearly when Pringle-Pattison writes: 
 
2Q WKLV ZKROH VLGH RI >%UDGOH\¶V@ WKRXJKW KH VHHPV WR PH WR UHSURGXFH LQ
essence, and often almost in expression, the Spinozistic doctrine of 
µLPDJLQDWLRQ¶ ZKLFK UHGXFHV ILQLWH H[LVWHQFH WR D VSHFLHV RI LOlusion. No 
doubt there are two tendencies at strife in Spinoza also. But his dominant 
WKRXJKWLVµDOOGHWHUPLQDWLRQLVQHJDWLRQ¶DQGWKHUHIRUHDOOGHWHUPLQDWLRQVDUH
devoured, like clouds before the sun, in the white light of the unica substantia. 
(Pringle-Pattison 1897: 173) 
 
Thus, while Pringle-3DWWLVRQDFFHSWHGWKDW+HJHO µGXJSKLORVRSK\¶RXWRI WKHµSLWRI
XQGLIIHUHQWLDWHG VXEVWDQFH¶%UDGOH\¶V FORVHQHVV WR6SLQR]DRQ WKLV LVVXHPHDQW WKDW
(despite himself) he put philosophy back in it again. 
 We have seen, then, that unlike some contemporary commentators, the British 
Idealist had a nuanced view of this issue, and one that seems to reflect the truth of the 
situation, concerning the differences between Spinoza and Hegel. We have also seen 
how some of thHPVLGHGZLWK+HJHOKLPVHOILQXVLQJWKLVLVVXHWRFULWLFL]H6SLQR]D¶V
apparently monism, together than of Bradley. In the final section, I now turn to 
assessing the cogency of that critique. 
 
5. Determination is negation and the problem of monism 
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It is clear WKDW +HJHO¶V FHQWUDO REMHFWLRQ WR 6SLQR]D LV WKDW KH HQGV XS LQ D
Parmenidean position, with a conception of pure being as an undifferentiated and 
therefore empty one. But how is this Parmenidean reading of Spinoza meant to work, 
and is it fair? Some recent commentators on Spinoza have sought to defend him 
DJDLQVW+HJHO¶VFKDUJHVXFKDV<LW]KDN0HODPHGDQG6DPXHO1HZODQGV23 How one 
VHHV WKLV LVVXH GHSHQGV RQ ZKDW RQH WDNHV +HJHO¶V DUJXPHQW WR EH ZKHUH WKLV WKHQ
GHSHQGVRQWKHUROHRQHVHHVIRUWKHµGHWHUPLQDWLRQLVQHJDWLRQ¶SULQFLSOHZLWKLQWKDW
argument. Having discussed the complexities of that principle, the hope now is that 
WKLV FDQ SURYLGH XV ZLWK D KHOSIXO EDFNJURXQG LQ DQDO\]LQJ DQG DVVHVVLQJ +HJHO¶V
argument. 
 One common way to understand that argument, is as an argument to monism 
from acosmism, where (following Maimon)24 this is taken to be the denial of the 
UHDOLW\ RI ILQLWH WKLQJV TXD FRVPRV ZKHUH WKDW GHQLDO LV WKHQ EDVHG RQ 6SLQR]D¶V
version of the determination is negation principle. How, more precisely, might this 
argument be said to work? 
 A first way of setting it out might be as follows: 
 
(1) $OOGHWHUPLQDWLRQLQYROYHVQHJDWLRQLQ6SLQR]D¶VVHQVH± i.e. a deprivation 
of being 
(2) Finite things are determinate 
(3) Therefore, finite things involve negation as a deprivation of being 
(4) Therefore, because they involve determination and hence negation, they 
lack being 
(5) Therefore, finite things do not exist 
(6) Therefore, there is no universe of finite things (acosmism) 
(7) Therefore, the infinite lacks any differentiation 
(8) Therefore, the infinite is a Parmenidean one 
 
So, because the determination is negation principle leads Spinoza to deny being to 
finite things, he ends up with acosmism and hence monism. 
                                                          
23
 Melamed 2010 and 2012b; Newlands 2011. 
24
 Cf. Melamed 2010: 78 note 4, and Melamed 2012a: 177-8. 
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 %XWLI+HJHO¶VDUJXPHQWDJDLQVW6SLQR]DLVWDNHQLQWKLVZDy, it would seem 
that it can be resisted fairly easily. First of all, there is a problem with the move from 
 WR )RU HYHQ LIGHWHUPLQDWLRQ LQYROYHV VRPHSULYDWLRQRIEHLQJ WKLVGRHVQ¶W
mean that what is determinate ends up not existing at all ± thH µSULYDWLRQ¶ LQYROYHG
need not be full non-existence, but could just be a form or degree of reality that is 
somehow less that that pertaining to what is prior to such determination. Secondly, 
even it is right that Spinoza is an acosmist in some sense, and so denies the reality of 
finite entities (so (5) is established), there are also problems with the move from (5) to 
(8), as monism can be avoided by attributing a plurality of properties or modes or 
attributes to the infinite instead, as is arguably Spino]D¶VSRVLWLRQ,WVHHPVWKHQWKDW
WKLVZD\RIWDNLQJ+HJHO¶VFULWLTXHLVRIGXELRXVFRJHQF\ 
 7KHUH PLJKW KRZHYHU EH D VHFRQG ZD\ WR WDNH +HJHO¶V DUJXPHQW ZKLFK LV
PRUHVXFFHVVIXO7KLVDUJXPHQWZRXOGIRFXVRQ+HJHO¶VFODLPWKDWKHIDLOVWRSURSHUO\
derive or deduce plurality from his conception of the infinite, in a way that leaves the 
status of that plurality questionable or problematic. For example, in the Lectures on 
the History of Philosophy, Hegel remarks: µ6SLQR]DGRHVQRWLQGLFDWH how these two 
[attributes, of thought and extension] SURFHHGIURPWKHRQHVXEVWDQFH«QRU does say 
ZK\KHVSHDNVRQO\RIWZR¶.25 So perhaps this idea could provide a key claim that can 
be used by Hegel to convict Spinoza of monism?26 
                                                          
25
 Hegel 1986: /+3&IDOVR6/µ7KHVHWKUHH>DEVROXWH
substance, attribute, and mode] are only enumerated one after the other, without any 
LQQHUVHTXHQFHRIGHYHORSPHQW¶DQG6/-µ>:@LWK3DUPHQLGHVDVZLWK
Spinoza, there is not progress from being or absolute substance to the negative, to the 
ILQLWH¶ 
26
 This is NewlanGV¶VYLHZZKRUHMHFWWKHILUVWDUJXPHQWEXWWKLQNVWKHUHLVVRPH
merit in this one: 
>+HJHO¶V@IXQGDPHQWDOFKDUJHLVWKDW6SLQR]DFDQQRWSURYHWKDWKLVVXEVWDQFH
admits of a diversity of attributes or finite modifications except by definitional 
substitution or by an appeal to an external source ± mental relations ± whose 
UROHFDQQRWEHMXVWLILHGE\6SLQR]D¶VRZQSULQFLSOHV«+HQFH+HJHO
concludes, Spinoza fails to show how his perfectly unified substance gives rise 
to any real internal diversity. Spinoza may want the One and the Many, but he 
HQGVXSVWXFNZLWKMXVWWKH2QHDQGHPSW\XQLW\WKDWµVZDOORZVXS¶DOO
diversity and determinate content. (Newlands 2011: 106) 
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 However, I also think this form of argument is not terribly convincing. Firstly, 
Spinoza does provide some account of how this link is meant to work, even if perhaps 
LWLVQ¶WYHU\VDWLVI\LQJ6RKHZULWHVDWEthics 1p16: 
 
From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many 
things in infinitely many modes (i.e., everything which can fall under an 
infinite intellect). 
Dem.: This Proposition must be plain to everyone, provided he attend to the 
fact that the intellect infers from the given definition of any thing a number of 
properties that really do follow necessarily from it (i.e. from the very essence 
of the thing); and that it infers more properties the more the definition of the 
thing expresses reality, i.e., the more reality the essence of the defined thing 
involves. 
 
Secondly, while Hegel does make this point concerning an absence of proof in 
Spinoza, it is not clear that he is worried here about the monism issue; it seems more 
likely that he is making a different objection which he commonly raises against other 
philosophHUV WKDW DGHFHQWSKLORVRSKLFDO SRVLWLRQFDQ¶W MXVW WDNH WKLQJV IRU JUDQWHG
which he seems to think Spinoza does here, in giving a weak argument for why the 
infinite must have a plurality of properties.27 But then, his focus is on the way in 
which Spinoza¶VSRVLWLRQLVQRWIXOO\VDWLVI\LQJIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIDVSHFXODWLYH
science, not with worries about its monism per se ± so the concern seems somewhat 
misplaced? 
 In view of these misgivings, therefore, I therefore want to offer a third 
Hegelian argumHQW ZKLFK WXUQV PRUH RQ WKH µGHWHUPLQDWLRQ LV QHJDWLRQ¶ SULQFLSOH
itself, and what we have learned about it so far. The central claim of this argument is 
this: precisely because Spinoza takes the principle his way, he therefore does not take 
it +HJHO¶V way, where the claim is that this way of taking it is necessary to move from 
SXUHEHLQJWRGHWHUPLQDWHEHLQJDQGWKXVWRµHVFDSH¶WKHPRQLVPRIWKHIRUPHU7KXV
Spinoza is stuck at the level of pure being, with Parmenides, exactly because he 
thinks determination involves a privation of being, rather than seeing it (with Hegel) 
                                                          
27
 )RUDYHU\KHOSIXOGLVFXVVLRQRIZKDWZHPLJKWWDNH6SLQR]D¶VDUJXPHQWWREH
which would imply that Hegel is wrong about this, see Melamed 2014.  
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as a necessary condition for being. Thus, for Hegel, what leads Spinoza into monism 
is the same as what leads Parmenides into monism: both have a purely affirmative 
conception of beinJ IURPZKLFKQHJDWLRQ LV H[FOXGHG DORQJ WKH OLQHVRI6SLQR]D¶V
version of the principle), and so conceive of being as pure being rather than 
GHWHUPLQDWHEHLQJIRUZKLFKRQHPXVWDFFHSW+HJHO¶VYHUVLRQRIWKHSULQFLSOH 
 I think this way of taking Hegel¶VSRVLWLRQLVVXJJHVWHGE\6WHSKHQ+RXOJDWH
when he writes: 
 
)RU 3DUPHQLGHV«>W@UXH EHLQJ LV WKXV SXUHO\ DIILUPDWLYH ZLWK QR WUDFH of 
negation or indeed change in LW LW LV WKXVµXQFUHDWHGDQGLPSHULVKDEOH¶7KLV
conception of being as purely affirmative continues to cast its shadow over 
subsequent philosophy right up to the modern period. It is to be seen, for 
H[DPSOH LQ6SLQR]D¶VDVVHUWLRQ WKDW µWKHGHILQLWLRQRIDQ\ WKLQJDIILUPVDQG
GRHVQRWGHQ\WKHWKLQJ¶VHVVHQFH¶«>%XW@$FFRUGLQJWR+HJHO¶VDFFRunt, the 
category of being proves to harbor within itself the moment of negation in 
several forms: the concept of reality entails negation in the form of 
determinacy and difference; being something entails negation in the form of 
otherness and finitude; and infinite being also contains negation insofar as it 
lives in and through self-negating, finite beings. (Houlgate 2006: 43-4) 
The argument may therefore be put as follows: 
(1) Spinoza holds that determination is a privation of being 
(2) He therefore holds that being itself is purely affirmative, lacking in any 
such determination through negation 
(3) But Hegel holds that being requires such determination 
(4) 6RIRU+HJHO6SLQR]D¶VSXUHO\DIILUPDWLYHEHLQJis indistinguishable from 
nothing 
(5) 7KHUHIRUH IRU+HJHO6SLQR]D¶VEeing cannot contain any differentiation, 
and must just be an empty Parmenidean one 
Thus, on this account of the debate, it pivots precisely on the different views each has 
RI WKH µGHWHUPLQDWLRQ LV QHJDWLRQ¶SULQFLSOH LQ VWHSV  DQG  UHVSHFWLYHO\ ,Q the 
HQGWKHQRQWKLVDFFRXQW+HJHO¶VFULWLTXHRI6SLQR]DWXUQVRXWWRGHSHQGRQZKLFKRI
them is right in their understanding of the principle ± is determination through 
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negation a privation of being as Spinoza holds, or a condition for it, as Hegel 
maintains? 
 0RUHRYHU WKLV WKLUGZD\RIWDNLQJ+HJHO¶VDUJXPHQWVWUHQJWKHQVKLVKDQGLQ
the earlier two. For, because Spinoza does not think that being gets to be at all 
through differentiation, there is no argument for why there should be a plurality of 
properties belonging to the infinite substance and not just one (cf. the second 
argument), where it is not possible for there to be just one property of substance with 
no negation, so this substance would be left propertyless, and hence an empty one (cf. 
the first argument). We have seen, then, how the debate between Hegel and Spinoza 
WXUQV RQ WKLV LVVXH DQG ZKDW ZRUN WKH µGHWHUPLQDWLRQ LV QHJDWLRQ¶ SULQFLSOH FDQ EH
taken to do. 
 1RQHWKHOHVV LW FRXOG EH DUJXHG HYHQ ZKHQ +HJHO¶V FDVH DJDLQVW 6SLQR]D LV
understood in these terms, it is still problematic. For, some commentators have argued 
WKDW +HJHO PDNHV D IXUWKHU LPSRUWDQW HUURU LQ KLV KDQGOLQJ RI 6SLQR]D¶V SRVLWLRQ
here.28 The error is not to mistake his Hegelian conception of the principle for 
6SLQR]D¶VEXWUDWKHUWRWDNH6SLQR]D¶VSULQFLSOHWRDSSO\WRall determination, and so 
to treat all determination as a privation of being ± which of course leaves being 
GHWHUPLQDWHOHVV DQG µHPSW\¶ LQ WKH ZD\ +HJHO VXJJHVWV +RZHYHU WKH FODLP LV WKDW
Spinoza in the letter to Jelles is only talking about figure and perhaps by extension 
finite bodies as involving negation in his sense, but not about other aspects of 
substance, such as its attributes, which therefore need involve no such privation but 
can be viewed affirmatively. As a result, therefore, it can be argued that Spinoza does 
not have to view all determination as negation in a privative sense, but can in fact 
accept that some determination applies to substance, and so save it from being an 
empty one. 
                                                          
28
 The main proponent of this view is Macherey 1979/2011, esp. Chapter 4. See e.g. 
2011: µ:KDWFDXVHVDSUREOHPKHUHLVWKHQRWLRQRIGHWHUPLQDWLRQ,WLVHYLGHQW
that the way it operates in Letter 50 to Jelles, it does not apply to any type of reality 
whatsoever. It obviously does not concern the attributes, which are themselves 
unlimited and whose essence contains no negation at all; we have explained well 
enough that they do not limit themselves in relation to one another, which is the 
consequence of their own infinity, and the condition of their substantial character; on 
the other hand, it would be absurd that they would limit themselves and be limited 
ZLWKLQWKHPVHOYHV¶)RUIXUWKHUGLVFXVVLRQRI0DFKHUH\¶VYLHZVHHBienenstock 
2007: 510-33, and also Duffy 2006: 33-42. 
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 Now, to fully deal with this issue would require an almost complete account of 
6SLQR]D¶VHQWLUHSKLORVRSK\WRH[DFWO\JDXJHZKHUHKLVV\PSDWKLHVPD\EHVDLGWROLH
± and obviously this is not possible here. But let us grant for the sake of discussion 
that this criticism of Hegel is right, and that he is thus perhaps too quick to generalize 
IURPWKH OHWWHU WR-HOOHVDQGHYHQRWKHU UHODWHG UHPDUNVRI6SLQR]D¶V29 and thus too 
TXLFNWRFRQFOXGHWKDW6SLQR]D¶VLQILQLWHVXEVWDQFHPXVWUHPDLQLQGHWHUPLQDWH± what 
would follRZIURPWKLV"2IFRXUVHRQHWKLQJWKDWZRXOGIROORZZRXOGEHWKDW+HJHO¶V
FODLPWRKDYHVRPHKRZXQFRYHUHGD IXQGDPHQWDOGLIILFXOW\ZLWK6SLQR]D¶V WKLQNLQJ
ZRXOGEHSXW LQ MHRSDUG\ DQG VR WRRZRXOGKLV UHODWHG FODLP WRKDYH µJRWEH\RQG¶
Spinoza. But conversely, it could be argued, at a purely philosophical level (rather 
than an interpretative one) it would now rather look as if Hegel and Spinoza are 
broadly thinking along similar lines ± namely, both would seem to agree that being 
cannot be a Parmenidean one, and that without some degree of differentiation, what is 
would be indistinguishable from what is not.30 Perhaps, then, the lesson really to be 
learned from this tangled history is to see where these two great metaphysical thinkers 
ultimately converge, rather than what fuels their apparent disagreements. 
 
6. Conclusion 
,Q WKLVSDSHU ,KDYH WULHG WRVKRZWKHFRPSOH[ZD\ LQZKLFK6SLQR]D¶VGLFWXPµDOO
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ LV QHJDWLRQ¶ LV WDNHQ XS E\ +HJHO DQG WKH VXEVHTXHQW %ULWLVK ,GHDOLVW
tradition ± where modern Hegel commentators have perhaps lost sight of that 
FRPSOH[LW\ , KDYH DOVR WULHG WR VKRZ KRZ +HJHO¶V PLVJLYLQJV DERXW 6SLQR]D PD\
possibly be strengthened when his full understanding of the dictum is taken into 
account, even if in the end these misgivings turn out to be misplaced.31 
                                                          
29
 $V-DFRELVHHPVWRKDYHDGGHGWKHPLVFKLHIPDNLQJµRPQLV¶KHUHSHUKDSVKH
should be treated as the culprit in leading Hegel astray? 
30
 It might perhaps be said that an important difference still remains: namely, that 
Hegel thought this determination came about through negation or limitation, whereas 
Spinoza does not. But even this is not so clear, as later in the dialectic of the Logic, 
the way in which the finite gives determination to the infinite (for example) is not qua 
limit, so that arguably at this early stage of the Logic+HJHO¶VDFFRXQWRI
GHWHUPLQDWLRQLVQRWIXOO\FRPSOHWHDQGODWHUFRPHVPXFKFORVHUWR6SLQR]D¶VRQFH
again. 
31
 I am very grateful to a number of people and audiences who have helped to 
improve this paper. In particular, I would like to thank Paul Franks for first drawing 
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